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De Se Attitudes and Computation
by
NEIL HAMILTON FAIRLEY
University of Reading
Abstract: There has been debate between those who maintain that indexical expressions are not
essential and those who maintain that such indexicals cannot be dispensed with without an impor-
tant loss of content. This version of the essentialist view holds that thoughts must also have indexi-
cal elements. Indexical thoughts appear to be in tension with the computational theory of mind
(CTM). In this case we have the following inconsistent triad:
(i) De se thoughts are essential.
(ii) De se thoughts are indexical, they have a (Kaplanian) character.
(iii) Computations can only take the syntactic type into account, they cannot take tokens into account.
If (iii) is correct, then it seems we cannot make sense of a thought which uses a character
such that its referent could vary from tokening to tokening. I argue that (iii) need not cause a
problem, while maintaining the CTM. I claim that computations need not be sensitive to the
features of a tokened symbol in the way that character demands. This job may be performed
by a non-modular part of the mind. Resolving the triad in this way provides a reason to accept
that indexicals in thought are possible.
Keywords: de se, computational theory of mind, mental files, Recanati, Perry, concepts, thoughts,
context sensitivity
1. Introduction
ESSENTIAL INDEXICALITY IN natural language is the “dominant” position in the liter-
ature (Cappelen and Dever, 2013, p. 2). Essential indexicality is the claim that
certain indexical attitudes cannot be replaced by non-indexical attitudes without
losing an important feature of that attitude (Recanati, 2012, p. 33). A second
position is de se essentialism, which states that certain attitudes that one has
about oneself (the de se attitudes) cannot be replaced by attitudes of a different
kind without a loss or change in what that attitude is able to explain. This view
is often defended on the basis that de se attitudes pose a unique problem for
theories of propositions.
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De se attitudes are often taken to have their own kind of content. De se contents
are contents that make a perspectival or first-personal reference to the person enter-
taining that content and are usually expressed in English with “I”. De se attitudes are
often taken to need an indexical element. If this is correct, then it seems that de se
thoughts (thoughts tokened when having a de se attitude) will also be essentially
indexical. When one has a de se attitude one has a de se thought, understood as a
sentence in Mentalese, e.g., I AM IN READING, and the thoughts have their own
kind of content which makes a reference to the individual thinking it.
I will focus on de se essentialism as including an indexical element, and will
use the term to reflect this, because this view seems promising for the essential
indexicalist and has come under pressure in recent debates (see Ninan, 2015;
Cappelen and Dever, 2013; Lewis, 1979; Perry, 1979; Millikan, 1990; Bermudez,
2017). This is a view that has been targeted by de se sceptics who deny that there
is anything essential about de se attitudes. De se essentialism can provide a useful
test case for the possibility of indexicals in thought, provided that de se attitudes
are also ones that include an essential indexical element.
A key problem with de se essentialism understood as involving indexicals is
that it seems incompatible with the computational theory of mind (CTM). It has
been pointed out that there is a tension between these two views, as computations
struggle to ascribe different tokens of the same type of symbol different referents,
but this is what indexicals require (Ball, 2010).1 (Throughout this article I will
use “computation” as short for classical or Turing style computation.) For
instance, different tokens of “now” will refer to different times. For symbols in
Mentalese to be indexicals they need a context of use to determine their content.
So, each new token of an indexical type will take the context of use into account,
potentially yielding a different content in each case. So, each token of this type is
treated as a token rather than an instance of a syntactic type. However, it seems
that computations can only treat symbols as an instance of a given syntactic type.
While this tension seems to make the CTM and de se essentialism incompatible,
which would be a serious problem, I will argue that de se essentialism can be compatible
with the CTM. The cases where a tension might arise, for instance in a mental module
dedicated to processing syntax for input or output of linguistic items, do not threaten to
make the two theories incompatiblewith one another. Instead, I will argue that we should
not expect computation alone to determine the reference of our thoughts.
1 When it comes to homonyms and proper names, it may be that the best way to understand these on a
computational theory of mind is to give each one an identifying subscript. So “bank” might become
BANK1 and BANK2, for the financial institution and riverside respectively. In these cases, we no longer
have an ambiguity that the context needs to deal with.
2 NEIL HAMILTON FAIRLEY
© 2020 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria
It follows that there need not be a tension between de se essentialism and the
CTM. I will claim that the inconsistency depends on a certain understanding of
the CTM according to which computation is the only means of processing infor-
mation and reasoning. I will follow Fodor (2000) in denying that we should
accept such a strong view of the CTM. Instead, the CTM need only commit one
to the claim that some processes and reasoning undergone by the mind are
computational.
On this weaker understanding of the CTM we do not need to maintain that all
the processes in the mind are computational. This opens space for non-
computational processes to occur in the mind. This means that even if we allow
that computations cannot deal with indexicality, we do not require computation to
do so to have de se attitudes that are indexical. I will conclude that this gives us
reason to accept that context sensitivity is possible at the level of thought.
2. Inconsistent Triad
The following three claims are widely held, and it is these claims which Ball
(2010) states are incompatible with one another (in an argument to be discussed
in section 2).
(i) Having a de se attitude is essential to grasping propositions in a de se way.2
(ii) De se thoughts are indexical, in the sense that they have a context-
sensitive (Kaplanian) character (Kaplan, 1989, p. 506).
(iii) Computations are only sensitive to the syntactic type of a symbol; they
are not sensitive to other properties that the tokens that they operate on
may have (Ball, 2010).
For a de se thought, a thought entertained when in a de se attitude, to be a de
se thought, one must realize that the thought is about oneself. Evans adds two
necessary conditions for thoughts to meet in order for them to be ones that we
have about ourselves.
First, one must recognize the thought’s significance to the “various special ways
he has (as every person does) of gaining knowledge about himself ” (Evans,
1982, p. 206).3 So if one entertains a thought that is about oneself but does not
appreciate that it can contribute to knowledge of oneself, then they do not realize
2 Perry (1979/2010, pp. 374–375) expresses this as certain belief states being necessary to access prop-
ositions in a particular way. Perry (1977), Ninan (2016) and Lewis (1979) discuss a similar view.
Catañeda (1968, pp 446–447) also discussed similar cases which motivated much of the ensuing discus-
sion on de se essentialism.
3 Recanati (2012/2017) makes a similar point about the SELF file depending on various epistemically
rewarding relations that we have to ourselves.
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that that thought is about them. A second necessary condition is that one “must
realise how to act upon propositions” (Evans, 1982, p. 206).
Perry’s arguments are to the effect that we cannot explain some behaviour with-
out positing a de se attitude. The argument’s form is that if two thoughts express
the same proposition then they should have the same effect on the person’s behav-
iour (all else being equal). When we have a de se thought, other non-de se thoughts
do not have the same effect on the person’s behaviour (all else being equal). There-
fore, these two thoughts are not interchangeable, and the de se attitude is essential.
To motivate de se essentialism, Perry introduces a case in which he is follow-
ing a trail of sugar in a supermarket, trying to tell the shopper that their sugar
bag is leaking. As he searched for the shopper:
the trail [of sugar] became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I
was the shopper I was trying to catch. I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack
was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn’t believe that I was making a mess. That seems to
be something I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following the trail
around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain
my change in behaviour. (Perry, 1979/2010, p. 366)4
Perry then wants to suggest that there is something special about this change
in belief. Without the use of “I” in characterizing the belief, it seems that we no
longer have an explanation for Perry’s behaviour:
When we replace [I] with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my
behaviour and so, it seems, no longer an attribution of the same belief. It seems to be an essential
indexical. (Perry, 1979/2010, p. 366)
The evidence for this claim is that we can explain some changes in behaviour
only by shifting from a non-de se expression (such as “a shopper”) to a de se
expression (“I”). When Perry thinks of the person making a mess as “a shopper”
he continues to search for them. It is only when he realizes “I am making a mess”
that his behaviour changes. It seems that even if Perry believed “Perry is making
a mess” he would still need to have a belief to the effect that “I am Perry” for this
to make a difference to his behaviour.5
4 See also Perry (1977) for further examples.
5 Recanati (2017, p. 180) defends a way of inferring, from the premises that a is F and the premise that
b is G to the conclusion that something is both G and F without invoking a premise to the effect that
a = b. This is referred to as trading upon identity. However, this move requires that two mental “files” be
associated with one another, in that they both fall under a third file based on multiple epistemically
rewarding (ER) relations. It seems that the self would have a file that is based on multiple ER relations.
Even if the self file (presumably the relevant one for de se attitudes) was not based on multiple ER rela-
tions (which seems implausible), it seems that trading on identity still requires some association between
two files, and this may be enough to maintain Perry’s point that there needs to be some sort of belief to
the effect that “I am Perry”.
© 2020 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria
4 NEIL HAMILTON FAIRLEY
Perry’s view has recently been targeted as being a special case of Frege prob-
lems (Cappelen and Dever, 2013, p. 59). Just as one learns that Hesperus is Phos-
phorus, so Perry learns that Perry is I. In which case, de se attitudes do not pose
a unique problem that would motivate their essentialism.
To illustrate this, consider a variant of the messy shopper case:
Pushing my cart down the aisle I was looking for CK (Clark Kent) to tell him he was making a
mess. I kept passing by Superman, but couldn’t find CK. Finally, I realized, Superman was CK. I
believed at the outset that CK was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn’t believe that Super-
man was making a mess. That seems to be something that I came to believe. And when I came to
believe that, I stopped looking around and I told Superman to clean up after himself. My change
in beliefs seems to explain my change in behavior. (Cappelen and Dever, 2013, p. 61)
This seems analogous to Perry’s case and if there is no difference between
them then the problem posed by de se attitudes is not sufficient to single them
out as essential.
Here I will give a summary of Ninan’s response to this worry, to help motivate
(i). Both (i) and (ii) are important for there to be an apparent tension with (iii).
Without (ii) there is no need for indexicality and without (i), or some equivalent,
e.g., de nunc attitudes, there is no need for indexical attitudes either. So, it is
important to give some consideration to each of these points, though my focus
will be on a tension between (i)–(iii). Ninan argues that de se attitudes create a
conflict between two desiderata that we should have for a theory of propositions,
beyond those generated by Frege cases. These desiderata are Agreement and
Explanation.6 Two agents x and y Agree when they have beliefs that are equiva-
lent to one another (Ninan, 2016, p. 100). For instance, if each is in a belief state
such that they believe that the sky is blue, then they agree. If one believes that
the sky is not blue, then they do not agree. However, there is an understanding of
Agreement which concerns their desires as well. These will be cases in which
two people have the same desires, relative to the case at hand (Ninan, 2016,
p. 100). So if we are watching a sports match and desire that the same team win,
we have Agreement in terms of our desires relative to that case.
A condition for Explanation is that two agents Agree on a relevant set of
beliefs and desires. As they want the same outcome and believe the same things
then they should perform the same action, all other things being equal (Ninan,
2016, p. 102). Explanation can be understood as a conditional, so that if two
agents Agree and all else is equal then they will perform the same action.
Ninan outlines his problem as follows:
6 I use capital letters to mark these technical uses of these terms.
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AGREEMENT would seem to entail if two agents agree on how things are and on how they would
like them to be, then those agents have the same beliefs and desires, i.e. they believe and desire
the same propositions. And EXPLANATION tells us that if two agents have the same beliefs and
desires, then, other things being equal, they will behave in the same way. But then it follows from
those two claims that if two agents agree on how things are and on how they would like them to
be, then, other things being equal, they will behave in the same way. But, as I shall now argue, this
final claim is false. If my argument is sound, it follows that AGREEMENT and EXPLANATION
are inconsistent … (Ninan, 2016, p. 103)
To show this, consider a case in which Ninan is being chased by a bear, and you
are watching this. Ninan believes I AM BEING CHASED BY A BEAR, and that
curling into a ball is the best way to avoid being mauled by a bear. Watching, you
may think NINAN IS BEING CHASED BY A BEAR and believe that curling into
a ball is the best way to avoid being mauled by a bear. You both desire that Ninan
not be mauled by a bear. So, you and Ninan seem to have met the conditions for
Agreement. It follows that you should both perform the same action because of
Explanation. So, you will both curl into a ball. But this prediction seems false
(Ninan, 2016, p. 104). Ninan will curl into a ball; you will probably do something
else. From this it follows that either Agreement or Explanation is false. This is a
problem of de se attitudes that does not seem to be reducible to a Frege case.
An objection is that there is not Agreement in Ninan’s case. Does the observer
have the same belief as Ninan does, if one is expressed indexically (Ninan’s) and
one is not (the observer’s)? Ninan assumes that there is Agreement. “Now if, as I
am assuming, we count as agreeing that I am being chased by a bear in virtue of
my having this de se belief and your having the corresponding de te belief, then
it would seem to follow from AGREEMENT that these beliefs have the same
content” (Ninan, 2016, p. 103). This assumption is perhaps something that
Ninan’s opponents would want to deny. If Ninan and the observer do not Agree,
then Ninan’s counter-argument does not work. There is no Agreement and there-
fore no Explanation either. So, there is no contradiction between the two.
However, if one adopts the perspective of the sceptic, then it appears there
should be Agreement, since for the sceptic there is no substantive difference
between Ninan’s belief and the observer’s belief. There is nothing special about
the de se attitudes on the sceptic’s view. The thought that “I am being chased by
a bear” could just as easily be replaced by the thought “Ninan is being chased by
a bear” without a change in Explanation. In this case, the two agents in Ninan’s
case Agree with one another. But then they should act in the same way, in virtue
of Explanation. This seems implausible. So, arguing that Ninan and his observer
do not Agree seems to undermine the sceptical position.
If de se essentialism is correct, then Ninan’s belief state and the observer’s
belief state can have the same content. Where they differ is in terms of how the
© 2020 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria
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contents are accessed. This also has the advantage of preserving a level of content
at which de se attitudes and non-de se attitudes express the same content.
Claim (ii) is that these de se attitudes make use of a context-sensitive character
to determine their reference. I take (ii) to be a part of this version of de se essen-
tialism. This does not seem to be an uncommon assumption, and including an
indexical seems to be essential to de se attitudes being represented in natural lan-
guage (see, for example, Recanati, 2012, p. 33). However, it is not clear whether
this should also be a requirement at the level of thought. In this article my main
aim is to show that indexicals are possible at the level of thought, with some rea-
son to think that there are such indexicals. Proving indexicality would go beyond
the scope of this article.
It should be noted that many endorse (i) without also endorsing (ii). Notable
examples include Peacocke (1981, pp. 189–190), Evans (1982, pp. 35, 159, 205;
1981, pp. 280, 284) and McDowell (1984, pp. 288–289); who argue that reference is
determined by a (de re) sense instead of by character. In this article I will briefly
defend (ii) but I will not engage too much with these views as my aim is to show
how the CTM can be compatible with indexicals, rather than to show that (i) entails
(ii). For the purposes of this article, I will nevertheless assume that one can maintain
both (i) and (ii). This is significant as it allows for the possibility of context-sensitive
thoughts on a CTM. Whether that view is correct is a discussion for a later time.
The indexicality that I have in mind is Kaplan’s context-sensitive characters, which
are non-constant. He claims that “Indexicals have a context-sensitive character. It is
characteristic of an indexical that its content varies with context” (Kaplan, 1989,
p. 506). These context-sensitive characters require a context of use to get a content.
The important point here is that these indexicals do not have a fixed reference across
all possible contexts of use; rather their reference depends on the context of use in
which the indexical is tokened. It should be noted here that though de se attitudes
might be indexical in Kaplan’s sense, they may not actually change their referent in
many, if any, contexts of use. In this sense, the de se attitudes will not be practically
indexical (Ball, 2015, p. 354). A practical indexical is one that “will very often link
different tokens to different referents, even if we hold the speaker fixed. Call terms
… that shift reference in this way practically indexical” (Ball, 2015, p. 354). By con-
trast, practical non-indexicals will not shift their referents in this way. Given that an
individual’s SELF concept will not shift its referent across contexts of use, these
thoughts are not practically indexical.7 However, this does not mean that they are not
indexical at all. They may still depend on the context of use to get a reference.
(iii) is the point that computations will interact with all instances of a given
syntactic type in the same way (Ball, 2010). So while computations operate over
7 Here I follow the convention of using capitals to show when a concept is being spoken about.
© 2020 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria
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particular instances of a syntactic type, they operate on tokens; they are not capa-
ble of treating tokens of the same type differently depending on the context in
which they occur. This is because computations can only track syntactic proper-
ties. They cannot consider non-syntactic properties like the context of use. So,
computations can only pay attention to a semantic type indirectly, by paying
attention to syntactic type. I will refer to this as the computation acting on a sym-
bol qua type, rather than qua token. Treating a symbol qua token would involve
paying attention to its non-local properties so that its semantic content is not just
a product of its syntactic type.
Claims (i) and (ii) are of interest to me as, when taken together, they support an
underdeterminacy of content at the level of thought. This kind of underdeterminacy
occurs when a given representational item S makes an explicit reference to the con-
text of use to establish a content or a reference. If this underdeterminacy exists at the
level of thought, then it seems that there is some context sensitivity at the level of
thought. If (i) and (ii) are true, then this underdeterminacy is essential.
However, Ball has made an argument to the effect that the CTM is incompatible
with indexical thoughts. The challenge can be put as follows. Computations can
only treat a symbol as an instance of a syntactic type. Indexicals allow for different
tokens of the same syntactic type to be of different semantic types. So, computation
cannot make sense of how indexicals function in thought. The conclusion seems to
be that we should not make use of indexicals if we have a CTM.
In what follows I will present Ball’s argument for the incompatibility of these
theories. I will then present some possible responses to Ball’s argument. My pre-
ferred response is to allow a non-modular, non-computational, general system in
the mind to ascribe reference. If this response is correct, then Ball’s argument
depends on a false premise and is therefore unsound. A CTM need not rely only on
computations to function. Two competing views will also be touched on. These
are the names only view and an indexing view. I will argue against both.
3. Argument 1 for Incompatibility
Claim (iii) is the claim that computations are only sensitive to the syntactic type
of a symbol; they are not sensitive to other properties that the tokens that they
operate on may have. Here is an argument taken from an unpublished paper by
Ball. It is not clear that he fully endorses the argument and his published work
seems to show a more concessionary position according to which whatever can
be done by an indexical account of attitudes can be done by a non-indexical
account (see Ball, 2015 for details). However, the argument presents a serious
worry for the triad of views that I wish to endorse, so I will take it seriously here.
© 2020 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria
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I will refer to this as Argument 1. Argument 1 draws on the syntactic nature of
the CTM to argue that the CTM is incompatible with indexicality.
Argument 1 can be put as follows:
(1) If there are constituents of the language of thought that have an indexical
character, then the computational theory of mind is not true.
(2) The computational theory of mind is true.
(3) Therefore, there are no constituents of the language of thought that have
an indexical character (1, 2, MT)
It seems to follow from this argument that the CTM is incompatible with
indexicals in thought, so (i)–(iii) are incompatible. Kuczynski (2007, p. 237)
makes a similar point but argues that this means we should dispense with the
CTM. As my aim is to show that there can be indexicals in thought, I will focus
on Argument 1 as it provides a better foil to this position.
The idea is that computations must treat all instances of a syntactic type in the
same way. So, any types which require different treatment are not possible. The
key premise to defend is (1); if (1) is false then Argument 1 does not work. (1) is
plausible in so far as the Type Sensitivity Constraint (TSC) is true (see below).
The TSC captures what is important about (iii) in a more rigorous way. Thus, if
(1) is true, it shows how a tension can be created between (i), (ii) and (iii).
The TSC follows from the CTM’s reliance on mechanical processors to perform
operations. A processor reacts in a mechanical way based on the shape of the symbol
it encounters. It may copy or delete a symbol or type a newone depending on the sym-
bol and its program. A second support for the TSC comes from the claim that if it were
false then we would be liable to produce errors that we are not, in fact, liable to com-
mit. These are errors of equivocation. I will elaborate on this later. I will first give a
definition of the TSC and explain why it creates a tension with (ii).
If the TSC is true, then we have an argument for the truth of premise 1. The
TSC is that:
There is some way of typing mental representations such that (i) if two representations differ as
regards their content, then they are of different types; and (ii) computational mechanisms such as
those postulated to account for reasoning are sensitive to type identities and difference among rep-
resentation tokens. (Ball, 2010, p. 5)
For a given symbol type T, its tokens can express a different content each time,
or not.8 If not, then there is less motivation to think that T is an indexical symbol.
8 The possibility that they refer to different things need not be practical here, so it may be that the sym-
bol always refers to one individual during that person’s lifetime. This does not mean that the symbol
could not change its referent, just that it need not change its referent to still be encountering problems.
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This claim gets additional plausibility when we consider that indexicals do not
refer as types (Recanati, 2012, p. 57).
If the tokens do express a different content, then the TSC is violated. Condition
(iii) is not met as the CTM entails the TSC. It seems that if the TSC is violated,
then we are no longer using a CTM (Ball, 2010, p. 13). This seems to require us
to choose between indexical essentialism and the CTM. Ultimately, I will claim
that this is not so, but I will first present some reasons for endorsing the TSC.
One way to defend the TSC is to look at the nature of computation in the CTM
(Ball, 2010, p. 4). A CTM will operate according to computations. “A computa-
tion … is a formal operation on syntactically structured representations. Accord-
ingly, a mental process, qua computation, is a formal operation on syntactically
structured mental representations” (Fodor, 2000, p. 11). These computational pro-
cesses are only sensitive to the syntactic type of the symbol that they are operat-
ing on.9 This is because the computations use a “processor” which has set
reactions to syntactic features (Pinker, 1994, p. 75). In which case, the processor
will be unable to take other features into account including features that it has
because it is the particular token that it is.10
If the processor could take non-local features of a token into account, such as
the context in which it occurs, then we are no longer dealing with a computation
that can plausibly be attributed to humans when they engage in certain kinds of
reasoning. It does not seem plausible that a human’s non-demonstrative reasoning
processes, such as abduction, operate over a human’s entire belief system. How-
ever, if a given syntactic type could have its content changed depending on the
context, then any number of contextual features might prove to be relevant in
determining that content. So, a process that determined the content of such a
symbol would need to be able to check for relevant beliefs and to be able to treat
the symbol accordingly in the future. This does not seem to be the sort of thing
that a computational processor can do. Instead, the processor seems to be acting
in a manner akin to an intentional agent who takes several features into account.
At this point, one of the key advantages of the CTM is lost as we can no longer
account for some rational inferences without already making use of rational
agency. This, at least, seems to be a part of the rationale behind Argument 1.
So, it seems plausible that, on a CTM, if two symbols could differ in content,
then they are of different syntactic types. We should expect that if two symbols
have different content then this should be reflected in how those symbols are
9 There are others who support this claim; for instance, Müller (2008, p. 119) states that “At the syn-
tactical level, the states or physical objects are taken to be tokens of a type (e.g. charge/no charge) and
are manipulated according to algorithms”. This suggests that it is their type that is important here.
10 While Argument 1 is, I think, novel, endorsement of something like the TSC on computation is not.
In which case, this argument seems quite important.
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treated. For instance, the belief that there is a postman at the door will (hopefully)
elicit different reactions to the belief that there is a murderer at the door. So, these
two contents will be treated differently. If a computational process is going to
acknowledge this difference it will have to perform different operations over
them. If computations are operations over different syntactic types, then one way
for the process to acknowledge the different content is to make use of different
syntactic types.
A second point in defence of the TSC is that if we were to deny it, then we
would be liable to commit errors that we are not in fact liable to commit. For
instance, “I should be disposed to infer from that is a cat and that is a dog to
something is both a cat and a dog” (Ball, 2010, p. 13). The point is that if we
could have a mental symbol whose reference varies with the context of use then
the computations involved would not always (if at all) be able to track this. The
processor would come across “that” and treat it as though it had the same content
in each instance. In which case, we would get an error of equivocation as pres-
ented here. However, given that we do not make this sort of error as often as this
theory would seem to predict, it seems that this is evidence against indexicalism
in a CTM.
This point is particular to certain sorts of indexicality, and it may not apply to
those cases in which we do not have practical indexicality, as is the case with de
se attitudes. This is because there would not be a prediction of an error of equivo-
cation. Given that the symbol type for the self would always be in the same con-
text of use relative to what it refers to whenever a given individual uses it,
i.e., the symbol type will always have the same content across all the contexts that
it is likely to be used across by a given individual, then we would not predict that
there would be these errors. This assumes that the “self ” symbol is the same for
each person, but even if it were not and each person has their own symbol, then
the symbol is still not practically indexical. (This is not to say that it is impossible
for there to be cases in which the prediction would change. For instance, some
sort of brain transplant might have this effect. However, in this case it is not obvi-
ous that the prediction of equivocation would be incorrect.)
Given that the mental “I” that will appear in the person’s belief state is not
practically indexical, it may seem like an unfair case to apply to Argument 1.
However, Ball seems explicit in taking his considerations to apply to such
thoughts as well. He says that:
the reason that the thought Perry expressed by “I am the messy shopper” was cognitively distinct
from the thought that he expressed by “John Perry is the messy shopper” is because the two
thoughts have different characters; in particular, the “I” thought has a context-sensitive character.
So, the “I” thought is indexical. I will argue that this explanation cannot be correct if thinking is a
matter of computation. (Ball, 2010, p. 4)
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This suggests that Argument 1 is taken to apply to indexicals in general, and
therefore to “I” thoughts as well, when these thoughts are indexical. These non-
practically indexical symbols will still require that a computation makes use of
non-local properties of that symbol, so these cases still seem incompatible with a
CTM. So, it seems we cannot have (ii) if we have (iii).
3.1 A response to Argument 1
In this section I will consider some responses to Argument 1. One response is a
modification of the TSC. An alternative TSC might allow for indexicals and still
be consistent with the CTM. The proposed change goes as follows:
Type Sensitivity Constraint* (TSC*) There is some way of typing mental representations such that
(i) if two representations differ as regards their content, then they are of different non-indexical
types, or of the same indexical type; and (ii) computational mechanisms such as those postulated
to account for reasoning are sensitive to type identities and difference among representation tokens
of non-indexical types, and sensitive to type identities and differences as well as other associated
information among representation tokens of indexical types. (Ball, 2010, p. 13)
Using TSC* might suggest that indexical symbols can have additional features
added to them to allow the processor to take the context of use into account. One
is to add an additional feature to each of these symbols, such as a subscript. The
example that Ball considers is to give a time stamp to each tokening of NOW to
allow the processor to track it appropriately: “for example, we could imagine rep-
resentations prefixed with a sort of temporal quantifier or operator (AT 2:00,
THE MEETING STARTS NOW), or representations that link the NOW to a time
via a sort of parenthetical (THE MEETING STARTS NOW [2:00])” (Ball, 2010,
p. 14). This allows the computation to take the context into account.
This proposal is like adding a subscript to the logical form of the thought. So,
in the case of de se attitudes an equivalent proposal would be to add a subscript
that identifies the person in question. Rather than having a mental “I”, one might
instead have a mental “INN” or a symbol that has a subscript that is appropriate
for the individual. Here, the subscript types the referent of the symbol to allow it
to get content, rather than having an indexical character.
However, we no longer have indexicals in this case. These are not types whose
tokens could express different contents or which refer only because of a contex-
tual relation to the referent; they are now different types, each with a fixed con-
tent across contexts of use. Sticking to the time example:
now it looks like for the purposes of computation, we have two distinct types: the nows tokened at
2:00 are type-distinct from the nows tokened at 3:00 … In general, any computational system that
has the resources to avoid making the bad inferences in question will end up treating the alleged
indexicals as of distinct types. (Ball, 2010, p. 14)
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Each symbol is a distinct type because they include the time to which they
refer as a part of their symbol. In this case, we no longer have indexicals. It
seems that a similar move can be made with “I”. We could have I@X, where X
is the agent referred to.
There are two ways that one can take this. One is to treat these cases as inde-
xed symbols. Another is to treat them as names. In either case the context sensi-
tivity is removed and (ii) is denied. So, the TSC* does not present an alternative
to the TSC which also allows for genuine indexicals. In which case, it seems that
we still have (1). However, this now presents us with a problem. Why maintain
that (ii) is true, when we could instead accept a name or an indexed view of de se
attitudes? I will deal with these objections in turn.
4. Alternatives to (ii)
I noted a couple of alternative positions that one might take when confronted with
Argument 1. One alternative is that in place of having (ii) we instead have mental
proper names. This is a position discussed by Millikan. I will first argue that this
is not available to someone who accepts (i). I will then consider the indexed alter-
native and present some arguments against that view. That these alternatives do
not work as well as indexical views provides us with some reason to think that
these thoughts should include indexicals. Other candidates do not seem to have
the properties that de se attitudes have, as I will argue in what follows.11
4.1 Millikan’s view: a names account of de se attitudes
Millikan is critical of the idea of indexical elements in thought. This is illustrated
in the following quotation:
Do I succeed in identifying the content of various tokens of my mental “@RM,” that is, do I suc-
ceed in reidentifying myself, only because I grasp for each token of “@RM” independently that it
bears a certain adapting relation to me? Isn’t it more reasonable that my mental “@RM” is simply
a mental proper name? I take different tokens of “@RM” to refer to the same not because of their
individual contexts, not as a result of some relation each of these tokens independently bears to
me, but simply because they are tokens of the same type. (Millikan, 1990, p. 11)
Here, Millikan expresses her disapproval of the idea of an indexical element in
thought. She finds it implausible that we would have a context-sensitive token
when a name would seem to fulfil the same task of referring to oneself without
the need to take the context of use into account. In which case, it seems that we
11 Proving that there are indexical thoughts goes beyond the scope of this article. That would require
an understanding of how thought and language relate to each other. It would also require ruling out all
alternative possibilities, which would also go beyond the scope of this article.
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should reject (ii). On the view that she presents (though does not ultimately
endorse), “my mental ‘I,’ my ‘@RM,’ is not an indexical” but a mental proper
name (Millikan, 1990, p. 11). She describes this as a Millian name so that the
only semantic contribution it makes is its referent (Cumming, 2016, S2.1). (This
does not seem to be the view that Millikan settles on. Instead, she opts for the
view that either the self does not need to be represented at all when we are think-
ing about what to do, or if it does then it need only be a [Millian] name.)12
The challenge that Millikan presents here can be put as follows. Why should
we prefer practical non-indexicality when we could make use of a proper name
for ourselves that would fulfil the same function? Recall that a non-practical
indexical will not change its referent across contexts of use with a fixed speaker
but will still select its referent in virtue of its relationship to the context.
This is pressing as having practical non-indexicality seems to come with addi-
tional commitments that we are not certain we should be making. For instance,
there might be some circumstances in which it could become practical
indexicality, e.g., if my “self ” symbol were to appear in your head. It also seems
to add an additional mechanism of saturation, where saturation is the process that
“takes place whenever the meaning of the sentence includes something like a
‘slot’ requiring completion or a ‘free variable’ requiring contextual instantiation”
(Recanati, 2004, p. 7).13 In this instance, that would involve assigning a value to
the indexical. Then the question is: what warrants this additional mechanism?
4.2 Responses to Millikan
One response is to say that these de se attitudes are only properly expressed in
natural language by using indexicals, such as “I”.14 Even if this true, however, it
does not seem to follow that the thoughts that we have must also use such an
indexical component. That seems to suppose that natural language and thoughts
are analogous in, at least, this respect. That seems to beg the question.15 We must
assume that thoughts are like natural language, but this is what we are trying to
find out. This will not do.
12 Millikan (1990, p. 12) writes: “my intentions are not designed to guide anyone’s actions but my
own. Hence they have no need to explicitly represent me. I do not have to take into account variations in
whose head a token of ‘@RM’ appears, nor variations in whose action it is supposed to guide. But, once
again, this inarticulateness in how the self is represented has nothing to do with indexicality”. This leaves
it open that the self is represented inexplicitly, and there may be a parallel with Perry (1986), whose view
I will not discuss here. At present, it appears Millikan opts for any inexplicit representation to occur by
default. There is no one else to whom this representation could apply.
13 If one takes a Kaplanian view then saturation we must still find a content for that character.
14 This is denied by some defenders of the de se, e.g., Bermudez (2017, p. 12), who claims that we
can use our own names as deferred uses of “I”.
15 Ball (2010) makes a similar point, to which I am sympathetic.
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If one believes that natural language is the medium of thoughts, rather than the
language of thought, then supposing that natural language and thoughts are similar
will not be begging the question (Fodor, 1975). This kind of view can be attributed
to Carruthers (2002, p. 21). This is not, however, an option that I will be considering
because I am assuming that the medium of thoughts is the language of thought.
A point against Millikan’s understanding of de se attitudes is that in the case of a
name, it seems that it is possible for a name’s reference to be forgotten, or to fail to
refer in some cases, unlike in the case of de se attitudes. Millikan’s name would be
somewhat different in this case, in that it seems very difficult to imagine cases in
which one has a de se thought that fails to refer (Anscombe, 1975, pp. 22–23). In
fact, de se thoughts seem to be incapable of failing to refer. If someone can token
them, then they can refer to themselves with it, and have done so (Anscombe, 1975,
p. 28). The same does not seem to be true of names. This seems to be so regardless
of the theory of names that one picks. These disanalogies between the way de se
contents work and the way that names work give us reason to resist Millikan’s point.
If names do not have the properties that de se attitudes have, then this gives us rea-
son to believe that names are not well suited to playing a role in de se attitudes.16
For this point to be convincing it is necessary to prove that “I” can have these fea-
tures as well. It seems that it can. Tokening “I” seems to make it refer. It is hard to
conceive of a tokened mental “I” failing to refer. If it is tokened, then it will be refer-
ring to the thinker that tokened it. For these reasons it seems that we can justify mak-
ing use of an indexical account, rather than one of names, to account for de se
attitudes.
This gives us some reason to accept that de se attitudes cannot be properly
accounted for by names, contra Millikan. This goes some of the way to
supporting the claim that non-indexical forms of reference would struggle to have
the features that we need to account for de se attitudes, which supports (ii).
4.3 Indexing de se attitudes
The second alternative to the view that I have defended is that rather than having
a SELF concept whose reference is determined each time it is tokened, we
instead index the concept to fix its reference.17 So we may have several
demonstratums, which lets us list the demonstratums as:
16 A reviewer has pointed out that there may be a special class of names that are incapable of failing
to refer, thus meeting the condition of de se attitudes. Supposing that there is such a class of names, it is
still not clear that they will do the required work, as one must realize that the person referred to by that
name is oneself. It is not clear that names provide a good account of how this is so, given that Perry
could believe that “John is making a mess” without realizing that he is making a mess. I discuss a similar
point in section 3.3.
17 I would like to thank Dr Nat Hansen for this point, in discussion.
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first demonstratum, second demonstratum, … (some of which may be null) as features of a con-
text. We then attach subscripts to our demonstratives and regard the n-th demonstrative, when set
in a context, as rigid designator of the n-th demonstratum of the context. Such a rule associates a
character with each demonstrative. (Kaplan, 1989, p. 528)18
To give an illustration, this is the difference between having a case such as “I”
and “INN”, where the latter has been indexed to an individual, NN.
19 This view
avoids the worry that the names view faced, because it seems that this sort of
indexing requires either a perceptual or anaphoric link to the object that it refers
to. They will be linked to their referent in de se attitudes via the agent’s aware-
ness of themselves and it seems that they will not fail to refer or have the referent
be forgotten as names do. But these indexed components also do not seem to be
indexical any more (Ball, 2010, p. 14). This indexing view seems to relin-
quish (ii).
There is, however, an issue with this account. We do not have a guarantee that
one is aware that the object that is indexed with “Inn” is oneself. To see this, con-
sider again the case in which Perry is searching for the messy shopper, except
that in this case, there are mirrors at either end of the counter so that as he pushes
his trolley down the aisle he sees a reflection of the messy shopper going down
the aisle on the other side (Perry, 1979/2010, p. 371). Perry points and says “I
believe that he is making a mess” (Perry, 1979/2010, p. 371). Suppose that here
we have a case in which the “he” is indexed to become “he1”. In this case, Perry
is not aware that he has indexed himself as the referent of “he1”. This shows that
indexing oneself is not sufficient to realize that one is referring to oneself.20
For the indexing account to be a useful account of de se attitudes one will pre-
sumably have to know that they are the NN. In which case, they seem to have to
judge that “I am the NN”. Doing this involves a non-indexed first-person concept,
the “I”. In which case, they must have already been able to think of themselves
in a de se way prior to having the indexed first-person concept “Inn”. So, the self-
awareness of de se attitudes cannot be accounted for by mental indices.21
Attempts to do so only move the question. So, the prospects for an indexing view
of de se attitudes do not seem to be promising.
To conclude this section, Argument 1 claims that if the CTM is true, then there
cannot be mental indexicals at the level of thought. This is on the basis that a
CTM uses a processor that can only react to symbols by taking their syntactic
type into account. However, an indexical view would require taking the symbol
18 A subject need not represent this relation to themselves.
19 Peacocke (1981, pp. 189–190) seems to endorse a similar view.
20 Similar problems are possible in the case of names.
21 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments in this regard.
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qua token into account.22 This seems to suggest that the CTM cannot allow for
mental indexicals. In this case, claim (ii) seems to be false when (iii) is true.
I have also considered some ways in which one might handle de se attitudes in
the absence of (ii) but have rejected them as they seem unable to capture what is
essential to de se attitudes. In the following section I will attempt to show that
this threat to (ii) can be avoided without giving up on the CTM.
5. Rejecting Premise (1)
I will deny that premise (1) is true. This premise stated that if there are constitu-
ents of the language of thought that have an indexical character, then the CTM is
not true. Denying (1) undermines Argument 1 while preserving the CTM. I will
argue that the CTM can allow for non-computational processes to occur outside
of mental modules. This means that one can allow that computations are not able
to treat symbols as anything other than instances of a given type without taking
this to conflict with (ii).
To do so I do not want to claim that there is a module that deals specifically
with de se attitudes which then must give an output to a general reasoning centre
to get content. Rather, I want to claim that the problem that Argument 1 raises
would only apply to those de se attitudes when they are processed within a mod-
ule. This might happen when someone wishes to express an “I” thought, and this
must go through a speech processing module, or a syntax module. But such
instances need not be problematic. That the module is not able to treat symbols
qua token does not matter, so long as a general reasoning capacity can do so. In
this case, it does not matter that the module cannot treat the tokens of a given
type differently; the general reasoning capacity can.
However, this is also not enough. It cannot be the case that the non-modular
part of the mind saturates the indexical and removes this context-sensitive part.
To do so would be to deny (i) or (ii). In which case, the solution will not have
been successful. If we take saturation to be a process of replacing indexicals with
22 A possible line of argument would be that it seems to be strange to have evolved a computational
system which has an indexical element that does not change its referent. Why not have a non-indexical
element that would not change its reference, in which case we have something that seems to be computa-
tionally simpler and does not have any unnecessary complexity (having only a content, rather than a
character and a content)? My response to this is to reject the idea that the mind is computational all the
way through so that what is computationally simplest is not the deciding factor in our understanding of
the mind. Furthermore, it is not obvious that we can account for de se attitudes without using indexicals.
So, this complexity may be necessary.
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non-indexical concepts, then it seems that an account of how an indexical thought
can refer without being saturated will be required.23
5.1 Restricting the scope of the CTM
Here I will suggest that the CTM can accommodate cases of indexicals without
requiring that it attempts to infer their content in a computational manner. Instead,
the symbol can be moved out of the module (if it was ever there at all) to be dealt
with non-computationally. This move requires endorsing a modular theory of
mind according to which we have domain-specific modules (i.e., modules that are
dedicated to a particular task and kind of information) and a general information
processing part of the mind that can deal with other processes that are not dealt
with by modules. This general part of the mind will be able to draw on relevant
and available information to whatever its task is at that time. It need not operate
computationally. I will first give some motivation for this understanding of the
CTM. I will then go on to deny that (1) is true.
The rationale for this theory of mind stems from the Frame Problem.24 This is
important because the theory of mind proposed above should not be motivated
only by Argument 1. That would make the solution ad hoc. This problem begins
with the idea that when we are making some, typically non-demonstrative, infer-
ences we try to make use of premises that are relevant to that task. A relevant
proposition can be understood as one that “if it were attended to would affect the
estimated subjective probability of the belief [derived by this reasoning]” (Fodor,
2010, p. 116). The problem is that this property is not one that can be had in vir-
tue of the syntactic properties of a belief or proposition (Fodor, 2010, p. 124).
Relevance cannot be determined on a syntactic basis because the relevance of a
given belief will vary depending on the hypothesis that one is seeking to prove
but the syntax will remain fixed. This means that computations cannot be respon-
sible for selecting the relevant premises for these sorts of inferences and tasks.
So, computations cannot be responsible for these inferences, yet these are infer-
ences that we make. This supports the case for there being a general, non-
computational domain of the mind.
We can, however, still accept computational processes that do not have to deal
with the Frame Problem. These will have to be performed over areas where the
range of possible information is already constrained, so that the selection of
23 This will not follow from all versions of saturation, just the one that I have mentioned here. If one
wished to maintain a Kaplanian account of saturation, on which the character interacts with a context of
use to provide a content without changing the representation, then the indexical element would not need
to be replaced.
24 At least, it stems from Fodor’s version of the Frame problem; see Kamermans and Schmitts (2004)
for other variations of the Frame problem.
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relevant information is not done as the result of a computation (Fodor, 2000,
p. 64). Instead, “the information available to perform a task depends on which
task it is; and the constraints in virtue of which this is so are ‘architectural’”
(Fodor, 2000, p. 63). This has the result that “modules are informationally encap-
sulated by definition”, so they do not have to select the information that they
make use of (Fodor, 2000, p. 63). This means that we can preserve a CTM with-
out having to claim that the mind is computational through and through.25
Now that a modular CTM is on the table, it is possible to give a way of deny-
ing (1) and therefore deny that (iii) causes a problem. (iii) can be true while (1) is
false for this reason. We can make indexical reference to an individual by making
use of a non-modular, and therefore non-computational, system. This can take
features of the context of use into account and giving a reference to indexicals
that occur in thought on a theory of mind that is still computational.
Here, I want to concede that computations do need to meet the TSC but deny
that a CTM needs all its processes to occur computationally. Instead, only the
modules operate computationally. So, the idea that we might have thoughts with a
character need not be incompatible with the CTM. So, the antecedent of (1) can
be true, there can be indexical components of Mentalese, while the consequent is
false, there can still be a true CTM. (It may be that all a computational module
can do here is provide a semantic constraint, which constrains which propositions
could be expressed by a term without determining a proposition; see Harris,
2018, p. 6 for discussion.)
This way of responding to Argument 1 can also avoid predicting errors that we
are not, in fact, liable to commit. Recall the worry that indexical symbols in
thought would predict that we are liable to errors in equivocating that we do not,
in fact, commit. For instance, “That is a cat, that is a dog, therefore that is a cat
and a dog”. This prediction can be avoided by avoiding a commitment to the
CTM. If the process is not computational then it is not a requirement that all
instances of a given type be treated as though they had the same content. So, each
instance of “that” can be treated as a token with its own content. So, this account
need not predict this kind of error.
In sum, this solution requires a modular account of mind. If the mind were
computational through and through, then the CTM would be incompatible with
indexicals. Instead, there needs to be some component of the mind that does not
function in a computational way. The Frame Problem also gives us reason to
think that there are such parts of the mind as this, so this is not an ad hoc move.
25 Alternatively, one might want to dispose of the CTM altogether. In this case, we also do not have an
inconsistent triad as (iii) ceases to be relevant. However, in this case one needs to propose an alternative
theory of mind that can accommodate indexicals.
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From here, we can allow that the context can be taken into consideration in deter-
mining the content of a proposition.
One response that might be made here goes as follows. I have presented a
dilemma between the CTM and de se essentialism. To resolve this, I have opted
to dismiss the CTM in favour of de se essentialism. But why not go the other
way and deny de se essentialism and keep the CTM? There are a couple of things
to say in response to this. One is that I do not think that this is what I have done.
I have not argued that the CTM should be disposed of. I have just argued that the
scope of computations should be restricted to modules, and that the mind is not
only modular. Of course, one might say that this makes little difference. Why not
keep a thoroughly computational mind and lose de se essentialism? One reason is
that the CTM must deal with the Frame Problem, and it does not seem able to do
so if it is thoroughly computational. Another is that the arguments in favour of
(i) are compelling, and until a flaw is found in them it seems preferable to main-
tain (i), with (ii), and limit the thoroughness of computation in a CTM.
Another option would be to lose modules and computation entirely and claim
that the general processing system does the work formerly attributed to mental
modules. Responding to this objection in full would go beyond the scope of this
article. However, there are still cases of what appears to be the encapsulation of
certain systems, which suggests that a modular account is still possible. For
instance, contour interpolation seems to be a modular process (Keane, 2018).
One objection that might be made here is that I have not offered a solution to
Argument 1 as the general reasoning processes are difficult to describe or under-
stand in any detail, whereas it is an advantage of the CTM that its processes can
be described. In response to this, I would like to emphasize that the move to gen-
eral processing is motivated by the Frame Problem. While there is a price to pay
in terms of which processes we can understand computationally, this is a price
that we are already paying.
Also, this understanding of the CTM is not novel and is well known from Fodor,
who is one of the chief proponents of the CTM. In his words: “when I wrote books
about what a fine thing CTM is, I generally made it a point to include a
section saying that I don’t suppose that it could comprise more than a fragment of
a full and satisfactory cognitive psychology” (Fodor, 2001, p. 1). A similar claim is
that “Even if input systems are domain specific, there must be some cognitive
mechanisms that are not” (Fodor, 1983, p. 101). From this we get the idea that the
CTM need not be expected to be exhaustive of our understanding of cognition.
The TSC still applies to those processes that are computational, but it is a mistake
to think that it must apply to all the processes that occur in a CTM.
While this means that we do not fully understand how de se attitudes should
work, it seems that if we adopt (i)–(iii) then however they work they cannot work
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computationally. This does not create an incompatibility with the CTM as it does
not need to process de se thought computationally. So, it is possible to have (i)–
(iii) without the risk of incompatibility. The incompatibility only arises if we
assume that a CTM must be computational through and through. We should not
make this assumption. Furthermore, my aim was to show how it is possible to
maintain a CTM while also allowing for indexical thoughts in the form of de se
attitudes. I have presented a means of doing that.26 This view differs from that
introduced by Argument 1 as indexicals are a possibility on this view.
6. Conclusion
To conclude, I have presented an argument that a CTM can be compatible with
indexical symbols, contrary to Argument 1. We can allow for this by denying that
the CTM requires that all processes, inferences, and so on, need to be done via com-
putation. This version of the CTM also has independent motivation from the Frame
Problem. This suggests that we can have context-sensitive thoughts, in the form of
de se attitudes, where these attitudes are both essential and essentially indexical, and
the CTM. This opens up an important dialectical space for future discussion.
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